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I. INTRODUCTION
Politicians enjoy talking about change.  This was aptly demon-
strated by Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign slogan:
“Change We Can Believe In.”  While change is often viewed positively
in the political arena, more often than not change proves to be painful
and difficult—especially with the law.  Arnold Bennett, a British nov-
elist, once stated, “Any change, even a change for the better, is always
accompanied by drawbacks and discomforts.”1  Change and its accom-
panying discomforts are familiar concepts to the attorneys and courts
that regularly deal with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the
Guidelines).  There have been over 700 proposed amendments to the
Guidelines since their inception in 1987.2  Some of these changes have
been minor clarifications or adjustments, while others have been
large, substantive changes.3  The amendments present attorneys and
courts with difficult questions of what the changes mean for today’s
sentences, for future sentences, and for claims for post-conviction
relief.
As a general rule, in claims for post-conviction relief, courts must
apply the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time the defendant
is sentenced.4  Subsequent amendments to the Guidelines may be
used, however, if the particular amendment has been (1) designated
as retroactive by the sentencing commission or (2) the amendment is
merely clarifying as opposed to substantive.5  A recent circuit split on
the effect of amendment 7066—which lowered the base offense level
1. Quotes by Arnold Bennett, THINK EXIST, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/any_
change-even_a_change_for_the_better-is_always/220763.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2011).
2. U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2009).  As of November 2009 there
have been 737 proposed amendments to the guidelines. Id.  In 2009 there were
eleven proposed amendments to the guidelines. Id.
3. For example, amendment 706 made relatively minor changes and included only
five pages for the actual amendment and commentary. Id. supp. to app. C, at
226.  By contrast amendment 651 made multiple changes to multiple sections of
the Guidelines and involved over forty pages. Id. app. C, at C-820.
4. Id. § 1B1.11(a).
5. See id. § 1B1.11(b)(2); see also United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109 (4th
Cir. 1995) (noting that subsequent amendments may be considered to the extent
they are clarifying and not substantive amendments).
6. The First, Second, Third and Fourth Circuits held amendment 706 is applicable
to career offenders.  United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2010);
United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. McGee, 553
F.3d 225 (2d. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Cardosa, 606 F.3d 16 (1st
Cir. 2010).  By contrast, the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits found amendment
706 inapplicable to career offenders.  United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381
(6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Darton, 595 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Tolliver, 570 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2009).
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for most offenses involving crack cocaine by two levels7—illuminates
both methods for retroactive application.  Amendment 706, which cre-
ated the split, was specifically designated retroactive,8 and its retroac-
tive applicability to sentences based solely on possession of crack
cocaine was not contested.  The split occurs when defendants are ini-
tially sentenced based on crack cocaine but their sentences are en-
hanced (because their criminal history qualifies them as career
offenders under the Guidelines) and then reduced (because the judge
grants them a 4A1.3 departure).9  While the application of amend-
ment 706 to career offenders created the split, another amendment—
amendment 651—if applicable, may resolve it.  Amendment 651 was
not designated retroactive and, therefore, is only applicable if it is a
clarifying amendment.10
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Tolliver, relying in part on
amendment 651, reached the correct conclusion that defendants con-
victed of crack cocaine offenses, who qualify as career offenders (an
enhancement to their sentence) and are later granted a downward de-
parture, are not eligible for a sentence reduction under amendment
706.11  Though the conclusion is reasonable, the court failed to provide
any justification for relying on amendment 651.  The court never ad-
dressed whether the amendment was substantive or clarifying and its
lack of reasoning was attacked by later decisions.12
This Note seeks to supplement the reasoning in Tolliver by ex-
plaining why the Eighth Circuit was justified in relying on amend-
ment 651 to reach its conclusion and how properly resolving the
applicability of amendment 651 cures the circuit split.  More gener-
ally, this Note seeks to provide a framework for determining when
subsequent amendments are clarifying and may properly be relied
upon by attorneys and courts.
Part II of this Note discusses the Guidelines, their history, and
their proper application.  Part III reviews the retroactive applicability
of amendments and specifically amendments 651 and 706.  Part IV
addresses the current circuit split and the divergent reasoning regard-
ing the applicability of the amendments.  Part V analyzes the flaws of
both sides of the split in determining the applicability of amendment
651 and proposes a new test for determining when an amendment is
clarifying or substantive.  Part VI concludes the Note by describing
how the new test not only resolves the current split regarding the ap-
7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C, at 226; see also infra sec-
tion III.A (discussing the history and purpose behind amendment 706).
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(c).
9. See supra note 6.
10. See infra Part III.
11. 570 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2009).
12. See, e.g., Flemming, 617 F.3d at 267–68.
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plication of amendment 706 but also provides a framework for analyz-
ing the applicability of retroactive amendments going forward.
II. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Prior to the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act (the Act),13 sentencing
was appropriately referred to as “the lottery.”14  Judges enjoyed a
great deal of latitude at sentencing which often resulted in disparate
and inconsistent sentences among similarly situated defendants.15
The problem was exacerbated by the ability of the Parole Commission
to reduce a defendant’s sentence—often resulting in defendants serv-
ing one-third or less of their actual sentence.16  Through the Act, Con-
gress sought to eliminate the real and perceived disparities by
creating a clear and uniform sentencing procedure.17  The stated
objectives of the Act were threefold: to achieve (1) honesty in sentenc-
ing, (2) uniformity in sentencing, and (3) proportionality in sentenc-
ing.18  Honesty in sentencing was to be achieved by ensuring the
sentence imposed would be the sentence actually served and the aboli-
tion of parole was thought to realize this objective.19  Uniformity and
proportionality, while the Guidelines note that tension exists between
these objectives,20 both seek the same goal: to ensure similar crimes
and similar criminals receive a similar sentence.21  Though striving
for greater uniformity, Congress also sought to provide judges with
some discretion by allowing for departures when the Guidelines failed
13. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
14. THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET. AL, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 10.1,
at 1573 (2001).  Prior to passage of the Act, federal judges were granted almost
unfettered discretion to impose any sentence within a broad statutory range. Id.
at 1572.  The only real guidance provided to a judge prior to the Act was that the
judge should consider “the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s
life and characteristics.” Id. at 1572–73 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949)).  Also, a judge was not required to provide his reasoning for the
sentence and only in limited circumstances could the sentence be appealed. Id. at
1573.  As an example, prior to the Act, a judge could sentence an individual con-
victed of bank robbery anywhere from probation to twenty years imprisonment.
Id. at 1575 n.2.
15. Id. at 1572.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1574.
18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 2 (2009).
19. Id. at 3.
20. The Guidelines note that uniformity could be achieved by simply lumping to-
gether simple categories of crimes. Id.  It uses the example of robbery and notes
that simple uniformity could be attained by sentencing all robbers to a fixed sen-
tenced—i.e., five years. Id.  However, this approach would ignore proportionality
by not accounting for important differences in each crime, e.g., how much money
was taken, was the defendant armed, were there any injuries. Id.
21. Id.; see also HUTCHISON supra note 14, at 1572 (noting the Guidelines sought uni-
formity by creating narrow sentencing periods that limited a judge’s discretion).
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to account for a particular aggravating or mitigating circumstance.22
Three years after the passage of the Act, Congress enacted the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.23
The Guidelines are based on the United States Sentencing Com-
mission’s (the Commission) empirical evaluation of approximately
10,000 presentence investigations from pre-Guideline cases.24  The
Commission looked at “the differing elements of various crimes as dis-
tinguished in substantive criminal statutes, the United States Parole
Commission’s guidelines and statistics, and data from other relevant
sources” to determine what courts considered important in pre-Guide-
line sentencing practices.25  The Guidelines resulted in a structured
formula where specific traits of the criminal and specific facts of the
crime are calculated to provide a defendant’s sentencing range.26
A. Application of the Guidelines
While an extensive discussion of the Guideline’s application pro-
cess is not warranted in this Note,27 a solid understanding of their
application is important.  As a starting point, the Guidelines must be
applied in the particular order established by the Commission.28  The
application instructions (Instructions) for the Guidelines dictate that
order and consist of nine steps (a)–(i).29  Applying these steps in order
will provide courts with a sentencing range for a particular defen-
dant.30  The sentencing ranges are based on a grid, known as the
Guidelines Sentencing Table (Sentencing Table), which consists of
vertical (base offense level) numbers ranging from 1–43 and horizon-
tal (criminal history category) numbers ranging from I–VI.31  The first
five steps of the Instructions relate to the vertical axis, or the defen-
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 6 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)).
23. Id. at 1.
24. Id. at 4.  Some scholars have suggested that because the defendant’s sentencing
range is based on the mathematical average of pre-Guidelines sentences
(sentences that were found to be akin to the lottery), the new Guidelines “suffer[ ]
from the same flaws that characterized pre-Guidelines sentences.”  Adam
Lamparello, Introducing the “Heartland Departure”, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
643, 654 (2004).
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 4.
26. The formulaic and mathematical nature of the Guidelines is displayed by the ex-
istence of a sentencing calculator where an individual can input various aspects
of a crime and the calculator produces the guideline range.  The calculator is
available at www.sentencing.us.
27. For a more detailed description of sentencing and the application of the guide-
lines, see Sentencing Guidelines, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 681 (2009).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The Sentencing
Commission directs courts to apply the Guideline provisions in a specific order.”).
29. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) to (i) (2009).
30. Id.
31. See infra Table 1.
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dant’s base offense level.32  The base offense level pertains to the de-
fendant’s conduct and starts with the number assigned by the
Guidelines for a particular offense33—for example, possession of crack
cocaine has a base offense level of eight.34  From there, the Instruc-
tions ask the court to make any applicable adjustments, up or down, to
the base offense level, including: adjustments for specific characteris-
tics of the offense,35 the defendant’s role in the offense,36 and the de-
fendant’s acceptance of responsibility.37  After the adjustments, the
defendant’s base offense level is set.
Next, the Instructions require a determination of the horizontal
axis, or criminal history category.38  Unlike the base offense level, the
criminal history category relates to the individual defendant and not
the offense.  The horizontal axis accounts for the defendant’s previous
convictions, the length of imprisonment for each conviction, and the
circumstances surrounding each conviction (e.g., committed while on
parole).39  Also at this step, the court may make any upward adjust-
ments if the defendant’s criminal history qualifies him for a sentenc-
ing enhancement, such as the career offender enhancement.40  After
the enhancements are applied, the criminal history category is estab-
lished.  Referencing both the base offense level and criminal history
category numbers on the Sentencing Table, the court establishes the
defendant’s applicable guideline range.  After the applicable guideline
range has been determined, the last step of the Instructions permits a
court to make any necessary departures.41
In addition to the Instructions, two specific sections of the Guide-
lines merit additional discussion: 4A1.3 departures and the career of-
fender enhancement.  The departures under 4A1.3 allow a sentencing
court to depart upward or downward in the sentencing range if the
court believes the defendant’s criminal history category over or under
represents the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal activity, or
32. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a) to (e).
33. Id. § 1B1.1(a), (b).
34. Id. § 2D2.1(a)(1).
35. Id. § 1B1.1(b).  For example, if during a drug trafficking charge a defendant is in
possession of a dangerous weapon, the defendant’s base offense level is increased
by two levels. Id. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
36. Id. § 1B1.1(c).  There are several role adjustments that are found in chapter three
of the Guidelines; one example is if a defendant was an organizer or leader of an
offense that involved five or more people, then the base offense level is increased
by four levels. Id. § 3B1.1(a).
37. Id. § 1B1.1(e).  Acceptance of responsibility results in a decrease of two or three
levels. Id. § 3E1.1(a), (b).
38. Id. § 1B1.1(f).
39. See id. § 4A1.1.
40. See id. § 4B1.1 to 1.5.
41. Id. § 1B1.1(i).
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over or under represents the defendant’s likelihood of recidivism.42
Section 4A1.3 is a policy statement as opposed to an actual guide-
line.43  The Commission realized that the criminal history score is
“unlikely to take into account all the variations in the seriousness of
criminal history that may occur” and therefore provided courts with
some discretion for departures.44  While this provision can apply in
several different circumstances,45 courts have frequently applied this
provision to grant downward departures to a defendant whose past
crimes were committed at a young age.46  As will be discussed later, at
what exact point in the Instructions 4A1.3 departures should be ap-
plied was a critical issue in creating the circuit split.47
Similar to 4A1.3 departures, the career offender enhancement ac-
counts for the defendant’s criminal past; however, unlike 4A1.3 depar-
tures, the career offender enhancement only increases the defendant’s
sentence.48  The enhancement in the Guidelines reflects a mandate
that certain offenders be sentenced “at or near the maximum term
authorized.”49  As a result, if a defendant qualifies as a career offender
they will generally receive a considerably greater sentence.50  Defend-
ants qualify as career offenders if (1) they were at least eighteen years
old when the instant offense was committed; (2) the instant offense is
a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance;
and (3) they have at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of
violence or controlled substances.51
42. Id. § 4A1.3.
43. There are two key differences between the actual Guidelines and policy state-
ments: (1) Guidelines and amendments to the Guidelines must be submitted to
Congress before they can take effect; and (2) Guidelines have a binding effect on
the court unless a particular departure applies, whereas no such requirement
applies to policy statements. See HUTCHISON supra note 14, § 1B1.7, at 119 cmt.
3.
44. U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 cmt background (2009).
45. See United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1307 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming a
departure because the defendant’s prior convictions were committed nearly ten
years before the instant offense); United States v. Abbott, 30 F.3d 71, 72–73 (7th
Cir. 1994) (remanding for consideration of defendant’s alcoholism at time of the
prior convictions as a basis for a departure); United States v. Brown, 985 F.2d
478, 481 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting the sentencing court could consider the defen-
dant’s history as an abused child).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 740 F. Supp. 1502, 1518 (D. Kan. 1990) (grant-
ing a downward departure for the defendant because of the “youthful age” at
which the past crimes were committed).
47. See infra sections IV.A, B.
48. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006).
50. The increase is demonstrated in Tolliver where the defendant’s sentencing range
increased from 188–235 months to 262–327 months.  United States v. Tolliver,
570 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2009).
51. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1.
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B. Modification of Sentences
Once a sentence is imposed under the Guidelines, it is a final judg-
ment that cannot be modified52 unless an individual qualifies for one
of the enumerated exceptions in 18 U.S.C. § 3582.  One particular ex-
ception allows a sentence to be modified if the defendant was: (1)
“[S]entenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
that has subsequently been lowered” and (2) the reduction in sentence
is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentenc-
ing Commission.”53  For defendants’ sentences to be “based on” a
guideline range that has been lowered, their actual sentence must fall
within the lowered guideline’s range.  For example, if a defendant’s
sentencing range for crack cocaine was forty to fifty months and the
defendant was sentenced within that window—e.g., forty-eight
months—then the defendant was likely sentenced “based on” the
crack cocaine sentencing.54  If that range is subsequently lowered by
an amendment to the Guidelines, the defendant may qualify for a re-
duction.55  If however, the defendant were sentenced outside of this
range—e.g., fifty-five months—the sentence would not be “based on”
the crack cocaine guidelines and the defendant would not be eligible
for a reduction in sentence.56
After clearing the “based on” hurdle, the defendant still must show
that his reduction is consistent with the applicable policy state-
ments.57  The policy statement for a reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c) states, “A reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment
is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore is not au-
thorized . . . [if it] does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s
applicable guideline range.”58  Therefore, the guideline range for a
particular defendant and at what step in the application instructions
it is determined are critical factors for deciding whether or not a de-
fendant is eligible for a sentence modification.
III. AMENDMENTS
As stated in the introduction to this Note, amendments to the
Guidelines are frequent.59  Even the policy statement found in the in-
troduction to the Guidelines emphasizes the need for constant amend-
ments.  The title of one section reads, “Continuing Evolution and Role
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
54. See United States v. Flemming, 167 F.3d 252, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2010).
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
58. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (2009) (emphasis added).
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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of the Guidelines”60 and notes: “[S]entencing is a dynamic field that
requires continuing review by an expert body to revise sentencing poli-
cies, in light of application experience, as new criminal statutes are
enacted, and as more is learned about what motivates and controls
criminal behavior.”61  While amendments to the Guidelines are cer-
tain to continue, the issue addressed here is when the amendments
may be applied retroactively.  The general rule is that amendments
may only be applied retroactively if (1) the amendment is specifically
designated as retroactive by the Commission, or (2) if the amendment
is merely clarifying as opposed to substantive.62
A. Designated Retroactive Amendments—Amendment 706
The amendments specifically designated as retroactive are found
in § 1.1B.10(c) of the Guidelines.  Amendment 706 took effect Novem-
ber 1, 2007 and was added to section 1.1B.10(c) as a retroactive
amendment on March 3, 2008.63  The amendment was narrowly tai-
lored to address and ameliorate an ongoing concern of the Commis-
sion, and others, regarding disparities in crack cocaine64 sentencing
when compared with powder cocaine sentences.65  The disparity is a
100 to 1 ratio that is easily demonstrated by the following example: if
a defendant was convicted of a first time trafficking offense that in-
volves five grams or more of crack cocaine, the defendant will receive
the same sentence as a person convicted of a first time offense involv-
ing 500 grams of powder cocaine.66  At the time of the amendment, the
Commission was prepared to submit a report to Congress on the mat-
60. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 12.
61. Id.
62. See Id. § 1B1.11(b)(2); see also United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109 (4th
Cir. 1995) (noting that subsequent amendments may be considered to the extent
they are clarifying and not substantive amendments).
63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C, at 226, 253.
64. The major difference between crack and powder cocaine is that crack cocaine is
cheaper and smokeable. CRAIG REINARMAN & HARRY G. LEVINE, CRACK IN
AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 2 (1997).  The term crack comes
from the crackling noise it makes when heated. Id.  Further, because crack is
cheaper it has been noted that the disparity in crack cocaine and powder cocaine
sentences disproportionately affects minorities—in particular, African Ameri-
cans. See Erik Eckholm, Congress Moves to Narrow Cocaine Sentencing Dispari-
ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/07/29/us/politics/29crack.html?ref=cocaine_and_crack_cocaine.  Roughly
eighty percent of those convicted of crack cocaine offenses are African American.
Id. The disparate impact on minorities was a consideration of the Commission in
adopting amendment 706 and making the amendment retroactive. See U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission Public Meeting Minutes at 4 (Dec. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meet-
ings/20071211/20071211_Minutes.pdf.
65. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL supp. to app. C, at 229.
66. Id.
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ter in the hope that it would “facilitate prompt congressional action” to
address the disparity.67  While waiting to submit the report, the Com-
mission thought it “urgent” to alleviate the disparity in the interim by
passing amendment 706.68  The amendment essentially reduced the
base offense level for most offenses69 involving crack cocaine by two
levels.70
B. Substantive or Clarifying Amendments—Amendment 651
Amendments that are not designated by the Commission as retro-
active may only apply retroactively if they are clarifying amend-
ments.71  Amendment 651 was adopted in October of 2003 but was not
made retroactive.72  The focus of the amendment was on departures
and making the Guidelines’ interpretation of departures consistent
with the directives of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the PROTECT
Act) which was enacted earlier that year.73  More specifically, the
Commission sought to “ensure that the incidence of downward depar-
tures [was] substantially reduced.”74  Unlike amendment 706 that
was narrowly tailored to deal specifically with crack cocaine, amend-
ment 651 was more expansive.  It made modifications to eight differ-
ent Instructions to the Guidelines, created a new policy statement and
a new guideline, and made other changes to policy statements, the
commentary, and the Guidelines themselves.75
While amendment 651 is broad, the only section at issue in the
circuit split was the definition of the term “departure.”  The new defi-
nition appears in the commentary76 to the Instructions and provides:
‘Departure’ means (i) for purposes other than those specified in subdivision
(ii), imposition of a sentence outside the applicable guideline range or of a
sentence that is otherwise different from the guideline sentence; and (ii) for
purposes of § 4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History
Category), assignment of a criminal history category other than the otherwise
67. Id.
68. Id. at 230.
69. The Commission estimated that the amendment would “affect 69.7 percent of
crack cocaine offenses . . . and will result in a reduction in the estimated average
sentence of all crack cocaine offenses from 121 months to 106 months. Id.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 5.
72. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, at C-878 (2009).
73. Id. at 871.
74. Id. at 872.
75. Id.
76. Commentary to the Guidelines are offered to help explain how a particular guide-
line should be applied. Id. § 1B1.7.  Additionally, it provides background on the
reasoning for the guideline and the factors the Commission considered in creat-
ing the guideline. Id.  Commentary is the legal equivalent of a policy statement.
Id.
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applicable criminal history category, in order to effect a sentence outside the
applicable guideline range.77
Prior to the amendment there was no definition for departure.  The
definition resulted in two significant changes.  First, 4A1.3 departures
were specifically designated as departures from the applicable guide-
line range and were therefore to be applied at the final step of the
Instructions after the guideline range was established.78  Second, the
definition—especially when coupled with other provisions in the
amendment—makes clear that 4A1.3 departures should only result in
departures in criminal history category and not a departure in both
criminal history category and base offense level.79
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have granted a re-
duction in sentence to career offenders under amendment 706.80  In-
terestingly, neither the First nor Second Circuits addressed the
applicability of amendment 651 and based their reasoning only on
amendment 706 and the application instructions.81  By contrast, the
Third and Fourth Circuits heavily discussed amendment 651, ulti-
mately concluding that it was a substantive amendment and inappli-
cable.82  However, the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all held
that amendment 706 is inapplicable to defendants who are designated
career offenders.83  Though none of these circuits provided reasoning
for their reliance on amendment 651, or even referenced the amend-
ment, they all relied on the new definition of the term “departure” that
amendment 651 provided.84
77. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(E).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Munn, 595 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225 (2d
Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Cardosa, 606 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2010).
81. See McGee, 553 F.3d at 228–30 (concluding there was ambiguity in the Guide-
lines and applying the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant); Cardosa, 606 F.3d
at 21 (determining that if the defendant’s exiting sentence was based on the crack
cocaine guidelines, then the defendant is eligible for a reduction under amend-
ment 706).
82. See Flemming, 617 F.3d at 266–67; Munn, 595 F.3d at 194.
83. See United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Darton, 595 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Tolliver, 570 F.3d 1062
(8th Cir. 2009).
84. See Pembrook, 609 F.3d at 385 (quoting the new definition for departure); Darton,
595 F.3d at 1194 (same); Tolliver, 570 F.3d at 1066 (same).
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A. United States v. Flemming
In United States v. Flemming,85 the defendant was indicted in
March of 2003 by a federal grand jury on three counts: (1) possession
of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, (2) possession of a fire-
arm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and (3) possessing a
firearm as a felon.86  Using the 2001 edition of the Guidelines and
based on the quantity of the drug and any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the Probation Office determined Flemming’s base of-
fense level was 24 and his criminal history category was V.87  His sen-
tencing range, therefore, was 92–115 months in prison.88  However, it
was also determined that Flemming qualified as a career offender
which increased the base offense level to 34 and the criminal history
category to a VI which resulted in a sentencing range of 262–327
months imprisonment.89  On top of this sentence, Flemming also faced
an additional mandatory 60 month prison term for count two.90
Flemming argued for, and was granted, a downward departure
based on 4A1.3 because the career offender enhancement overstated
his criminal history.91  The departure returned Flemming’s base of-
fense level to 24 and criminal history category to V—the numbers
originally established for the crack cocaine offense minus the career
offender enhancement.92  Flemming’s final sentence was 115 months
imprisonment (the top of the crack cocaine range), plus the mandatory
60 month prison term for count two, resulting in a total sentence of
175 months.93  After amendment 706 was made retroactive, Flem-
ming unsuccessfully sought a sentence reduction pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 3582(c) arguing he was sentenced based on a sentencing range
that had been subsequently lowered.94
1. Applicable Guideline Range
On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that in order to grant a sen-
tence reduction, Flemming must have been (1) sentenced based on a
sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by amendment 706
85. 617 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2010).
86. Id. at 254–55.
87. Id. at 255.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (requiring that all defendants who
possess a firearm during a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence be sen-
tenced to a minimum of five years).
91. See Flemming, 617 F.3d at 255.  The court granted the departure for two reasons:
(1) Flemming’s age when the qualifying offenses where committed and (2) the fact
his previous crimes were unrelated. Id. at 256.
92. Id. at 256.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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and (2) the sentence reduction must be consistent with the applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.95  The court
quickly determined that the first element was satisfied because Flem-
ming’s sentence, after the departure by the court from the career of-
fender enhancement, was based on the guidelines for crack cocaine
that were altered by amendment 706.96  The ultimate question for the
court was whether or not the sentence reduction was consistent with
the Commission’s policy statements.97
The policy statements provide that a sentence reduction that is
based on a retroactive amendment is not consistent with the policy
statements if it “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s
applicable guideline range.”98  The court looked to the application in-
structions for guidance as to what the applicable guideline range is
and when it is established.99  Initially, the court noted that the Guide-
lines “contain no global definition of the phrase applicable guideline
range.”100  However, courts have generally concluded that the applica-
ble guideline range is established at step (h) of the Instructions.101
Next, the court attempted to ascertain at what point in the Instruc-
tions 4A1.3 departures are applied and reasoned that if applied before
the applicable guideline range is established at step (h), then it is a
departure to the applicable guideline range and Flemming would
qualify for a reduction; if applied after step (h), it is a departure from
the applicable guideline range and there could be no reduction.102
The government contended, and the court found it plausible, that
4A1.3 departures are to be applied after the applicable guideline
range is established.103  The court noted that the last step of the In-
structions asks courts to apply departures and “any other policy state-
ments . . . that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence.”104
Because 4A1.3 is both a policy statement and a departure, the court
95. Id. at 257 (internal citation omitted).
96. Id. at 259–60.
97. Id. at 260.
98. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (2009) (emphasis added);
see supra subsection II.A.2.
99. Flemming, 617 F.3d at 261.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Flemming, 617 F.3d at 262–63 (noting the applicable guideline range is
established at step (h)); United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 2010)
(same); United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2009) (same).
102. Flemming, 617 F.3d at 262–64.  The court noted that if the applicable guideline
range “is the sentencing range calculated under the Career Offender Guidelines,”
then an offender is not eligible for a reduction because the career offender range
was not affected by amendment 706. Id. at 260.  However, if the applicable
guideline range “is the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range—which is affected by
Amendment 706—[an offender] is eligible for a sentence reduction.” Id.
103. Id. at 261, 264.
104. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(i) (2009).
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found plausible that it should be applied at this last step, in which
case the departure would be a departure from the applicable guideline
range.105  If 4A1.3 departures are applied at the last step then the
career offender enhancement—not the baseline crack cocaine guide-
lines—would represent Flemming’s applicable guideline range.106
Under this interpretation, amendment 706 (reducing only the crack
cocaine guideline range) did not affect (or lower) Flemming’s guideline
range.107
However, the court found equally plausible an alternative interpre-
tation of the Instructions that would require 4A1.3 departures to be
applied before the applicable guideline range is established.108  Step
(f) of the Instructions, the same step that the career offender enhance-
ment is applied, asks the court to apply Part A of Chapter 4.109  The
4A1.3 departures are found in Part A of Chapter 4 and accordingly
could reasonably be applied at this step.110  If 4A1.3 departures are to
be applied at this step, then the departure is a departure to the appli-
cable guideline range and Flemming’s applicable guideline range
would be the crack cocaine guidelines—not the career offender en-
hancement.111  Further, because amendment 706 does have the effect
of lowering the crack cocaine guidelines, it would be applicable.112  Be-
cause both readings are plausible, the court found the Instructions
ambiguous.113
2. Amendment 651
Amendment 651, if applicable, resolves this ambiguity by specifi-
cally providing that 4A1.3 departures “effect a sentence outside the
applicable guideline range.”114  The court in Flemming appeared to
agree noting that 651 “appears . . . to suggest” and “appears to indi-
cate” that 4A1.3 departures are departures from the applicable guide-
line range.115  However, the court concluded amendment 651 was
substantive and therefore inapplicable.116  To reach this conclusion,
the court relied on a simple test: “[I]f an amended guideline and com-
mentary overrule a prior judicial construction of the guidelines, it is
substantive; if it confirms our prior reading of the guidelines and does




109. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(f).
110. Id. § 4A.
111. Flemming, 617 F.3d at 264.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 265.
114. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(E).
115. Flemming, 617 F.3d at 266.
116. Id. at 267–68.
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not disturb prior precedent, it is clarifying.”117  The new definition of
departures in amendment 651 conflicted with the Third Circuit’s prior
judicial construction of the guidelines.  Specifically, the court had pre-
viously determined in United States v. Shoupe118 that 4A1.3 depar-
tures could result in adjustments to both the base offense level and
criminal history category.  The new definition of departure conflicted
with Shoupe because it expressly limited 4A1.3 departures to adjust-
ments in the criminal history category only.119  The court concluded
that this conflict made the amendment substantive and, therefore,
inapplicable.120
Because amendment 651 was inapplicable, the court found the ap-
plication instructions to be ambiguous.121  The Guidelines could plau-
sibly be read to require 4A1.3 departures to be applied prior to
determining the applicable guideline range or to be applied after.122
When the Guidelines are ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires courts
to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant.123  However, the
rule of lenity is only applicable when the ambiguity is grievous.124
The court in Flemming found the Instructions to be “grievously ambig-
uous” because it led to two plausible but contradictory interpretations
and resolved the ambiguity in favor of Flemming.125
B. United States v. Tolliver
Unlike Flemming, the court in United States v. Tolliver,126 did not
find the application instructions to be ambiguous and held that all de-
partures, including 4A1.3 departures, are a departure from the appli-
cable guideline range.  It is important to note from the outset that
Tolliver did not involve 4A1.3 departures but, rather, a departure
based on a signed stipulation agreement.127  Even though Tolliver did
117. Id. at 267 (citing United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2001)).
118. 35 F.3d 835 (3d Cir. 2001).
119. Flemming, 617 F.3d at 267.
120. Id. It is worth noting that the court was also swayed by the fact that both the
government and Flemming agreed at oral argument that the new definition of
departure was a substantive change in the law. Id. Admitting the change was
substantive was a mistake by the government.
121. Id. at 269.
122. Id. at 269–70.
123. Id. (“[W]hen ambiguity in a criminal statute cannot be clarified by either its legis-
lative history or inferences drawn from the overall statutory scheme, the ambigu-
ity is resolved in favor of the defendant.”  (quoting United States v. Pollen, 978
F.2d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 1992))).
124. Id. at 270  (“To invoke the rule [of lenity], we must conclude that there is a griev-
ous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.”  (quoting Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39(1998))).
125. Id. at 272.
126. 570 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2009).
127. Id. at 1064.
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not involve 4A1.3 departures, the court still stated, though in dicta,
that all departures—including 4A1.3 departures—are departures
from the applicable guideline range.128
In March of 1998, Tolliver pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
and intent to distribute crack cocaine.129  His base offense level was
set at 34, his criminal history level was determined to be VI, and his
resulting guideline range was 188–235 months.130  The parties origi-
nally contemplated in a plea agreement that the proper sentence
should be at the bottom of this range.131  However, the probation of-
ficer determined that Tolliver qualified as a career offender which did
not change his base offense level or criminal history category but re-
sulted in a higher sentencing range of 262–327 months.132  Tolliver
filed motions to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and the par-
ties ultimately signed a stipulation agreement that allowed Tolliver to
be sentenced to 188 months as they originally contemplated in his
plea agreement—this sentence was at the bottom of the crack cocaine
guideline range.133  After amendment 706 was made retroactive, Tol-
liver argued that his sentence was based on the crack cocaine guide-
lines and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) he was eligible for a
reduction in sentence.134  The district court disagreed noting the
amended guidelines did not change Tolliver’s status as a career of-
fender and Tolliver appealed.135
1. Applicable Guideline Range
Much like the court in Flemming, the government’s argument (and
the starting point of the court’s decision) centered on the Instructions
and determining when the applicable guideline range is estab-
lished.136  Identical to Flemming, the court agreed that the applicable
guideline range is established at step (h).137  However, unlike Flem-
ming, the court did not find any ambiguity in the Instructions.  The
court noted that the last step of the Instructions asks courts to apply
any applicable departures and that the stipulation was applicable at
128. Id. at 1066.  Several months later, in a case involving the career offender en-
hancement and a 4A1.3 departure, the Eighth Circuit explicitly held that 4A1.3
departures are departures from the applicable guideline range and amendment
706 is inapplicable.  United States v. Blackmon, 584 F.3d 1115, 1116 (8th Cir.
2009).
129. Tolliver, 570 F.3d at 1063–64.






136. Id. at 1065.
137. Id. at 1065–66; see also supra note 101 (citing authority that the applicable guide-
line range is established at step (h)).
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this step and therefore was a departure from the applicable guideline
range.138  Relying on the new definition for departures provided by
amendment 651, the court further reasoned that “all departures [are]
outside the applicable guideline range.”139
2. Amendment 651
While the court in Flemming provided some basis for its decision
not to apply amendment 651,140 Tolliver failed to give any explana-
tions for its reliance on the amendment.  Again, it is important to note
that Tolliver did not involve 4A1.3 departures but, rather, a departure
based on a stipulation agreement and the court would not have needed
amendment 651 to conclude that a stipulation agreement was a depar-
ture from the applicable guideline range.141 However, it did rely on
the new definition from amendment 651 to define all departures, in-
cluding 4A1.3 departures, as outside the applicable guideline range.
The failure of Tolliver to provide any reasoning for its reliance on
amendment 651 was justifiably criticized by later decisions;142 despite
the criticism, the court in Tolliver reached the correct conclusion.
V. ANALYSIS
While the application of amendment 706 created the split, amend-
ment 651—if it can be applied retroactively—has the ability to resolve
it.  Indeed Flemming recognized as much by stating that amendment
651 “appears . . . to suggest” and “appears to indicate” that 4A1.3 de-
partures are departures from the applicable guideline range.143  Al-
though amendment 651 resolves the split, neither side has reasoned
or provided a cohesive framework for its retroactive application. Tolli-
ver, and other courts applying similar reasoning,144 provided no anal-
ysis on amendment 651’s retroactive application and the test in
Flemming is too simplistic, ignores precedent from its own circuit, and
fails to consider additional relevant factors.
138. Id. at 1067.
139. Id. at 1066.  The court in Tolliver never specifically mentions amendment 651 by
name, but it does rely on the new definition that was added as part of amendment
651 to reach this conclusion. Id.
140. See supra subsection IV.A.2.
141. See United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 263 n.16 (3d Cir. 2010).
142. See, e.g., id. at 267–68.
143. Id. at 266.  The court also stated that the new definition for departure “may re-
solve this ambiguity,” when referring to the ambiguity in the Instructions to the
Guidelines. Id. at 270.
144. See United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Darton, 595 F.3d 1191, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying the new definition for
departure without reference or discussion of amendment 651 and its
applicability).
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A. The Flemming Test
In Flemming, the court applied a simple, bright-line test to deter-
mine whether or not amendment 651 was substantive or clarifying.  It
stated, “[I]f an amended guideline and commentary overrule a prior
judicial construction of the guidelines, it is substantive; if it confirms
our prior reading of the guidelines and does not disturb prior prece-
dent, it is clarifying.”145  Interestingly, the Third Circuit—the same
circuit that decided Flemming—in United States v. Marmolejos,146
previously undermined this very test.  The Marmolejos court con-
cluded that a conflict with prior precedent does not make an amend-
ment substantive and inapplicable, stating that even though an
amendment “may alter the practice of courts in construing . . . and
may even reverse caselaw interpreting [the Guidelines], it is the text
of the amendment—not the courts gloss on the text—that ultimately
determines whether the amendment is a clarification or a substantive
revision.”147
Similar to the defendants in both Tolliver and Flemming, the de-
fendant in Marmolejos, sought post-conviction relief based on a subse-
quent amendment to the Guidelines.148  The amendment established
how to calculate the appropriate drug quantity if the offense involves
a negotiation to traffic in narcotics.149  The court noted that the pre-
amendment version of the Guidelines provided that “weight under ne-
gotiation” would be the applicable amount in an uncompleted transac-
tion.150  However, the Guidelines were silent on the applicable
quantity for completed transactions.151  The amendment provided a
separate standard for determining the applicable quantity in both
completed and uncompleted transactions.152  The amendment, how-
ever, conflicted with the court’s prior construction of the Guidelines
that established the weight under negotiation would be the applicable
quantity in both completed and uncompleted transactions.153  The
government argued this conflict with prior precedent made the
amendment substantive and inapplicable.154  The court disagreed,
noting that an “inconsistency between caselaw and the amendment
145. Flemming, 617 F.3d at 267 (citing United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 303 (3d
Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2010);
United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying this same
test).
146. 140 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998).
147. Id. at 492.
148. Id. at 489.




153. Id. at 492.
154. Id.
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. . . [does not] require[ ] a conclusion that the amendment works a
substantive change [in the law].”155  The court further found that the
amendment resolved an ambiguity in the law and that the court was
not “bound to close its eyes to the new source of enlightenment.”156
Identical to the amendment at issue in Marmolejos, amendment
651 operates to resolve an ambiguity in the law and courts should not
close their eyes to this new source of enlightenment.  The ambiguity
created by when to apply 4A1.3 departures was precisely the reason
the court in Flemming opted for the rule of lenity and resolved the
issue in favor of the defendant.157  If an amendment resolves an ambi-
guity in the law, the amendment should be given consideration when
possible.  While resolving ambiguity is not the only additional factor
that should be considered when determining if an amendment is clari-
fying or substantive, it is one of several factors missing from the sim-
plistic test applied in Flemming.
B. A New Test
There is a need for a new test.  A test that only looks at potential
conflicts with precedent is too simplistic.  While there is little discus-
sion regarding the proper test for determining clarifying amendments
(many, and perhaps a majority, apply the Flemming test),158 some
courts have attempted to construct an analysis that accounts for im-
portant factors lacking in the Flemming test.  For example, in United
States v. Geerken159 the court recognized the difficulty in determining
if an amendment is substantive or clarifying and used a multifaceted
test to resolve the issue.  The test analyzes: “(1) how the Sentencing
Commission characterized the amendment; (2) whether the amend-
ment changes the language of the guideline itself or changes only the
commentary for the guideline; and (3) whether the amendment re-
solves an ambiguity in the original wording of the guideline.”160  An-
155. Id. at 493.
156. Id.
157. See supra subsection IV.A.3.
158. See cases cited supra note 145.
159. 506 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2007).  In Geerken, the defendant was convicted of posses-
sion of child pornography. Id. at 463.  In his plea agreement, the defendant stipu-
lated that he possessed 204 still images and 49 videos or movies. Id.  At
sentencing he received several enhancements to his base offense level; one of the
enhancements—a five level increase—was based on his possession of 600 or more
images of child pornography. Id.  Although Geerken’s crime was committed in
2003 and the sentencing court used the 2003 Guidelines, the court also relied on
a 2004 amendment that defined the term images. Id. at 465.  The 2004 amend-
ment provided that one movie was the equivalent of 75 still images and using this
75:1 ratio, the court concluded that the defendant possessed 3,675 video images
and 204 still images for a total of 3,879 images. Id. at 464.
160. Id. at 465.
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other similar test is found, in United States v. Thompson161 where the
court, identical to Geerken, analyzed how the Commission character-
ized the amendment and whether it revised the Guidelines or only the
commentary to the Guidelines.  However, in Thompson, the court did
not include resolution of ambiguity in its analysis; instead, the court
added as an additional factor, the Flemming test—whether the
amendment overrules a prior precedent.162
Unlike the test in Flemming, the tests in both Geerken and Thomp-
son look at several factors to determine whether an amendment is
substantive or clarifying.  A synthesis of the tests applied in Geerken,
Thompson, and Flemming provide a more nuanced approach that will
not only account for the importance of preserving prior precedent and
stare decisis163 found in the Flemming test but also will better pro-
mote the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act by achieving uniformity
in sentencing.164  To determine if an amendment is substantive or
clarifying, the new test requires courts to analyze: (1) how the Com-
mission characterized the amendment; (2) whether the amendment
changes the actual Guideline language or only changes the Guidelines
commentary; (3) whether the amendment overrules prior precedent;
and (4) whether the amendment resolves an ambiguity in the
Guidelines.
These four elements should all be given consideration; however,
the purpose of the Guidelines and the purpose in amending the Guide-
lines, supports a conclusion that resolution of ambiguity is a crucial
factor and should be considered more heavily than others.165  As
stated in Part II of this Note, the objective in creating the Guidelines
was to promote honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentenc-
ing.  Ambiguity is perhaps the greatest threat to these objectives.  The
remaining factors, while all important, do not promote the fundamen-
tal purpose of the Guidelines as clearly as resolving ambiguity.  Fur-
ther, the remaining elements can, and in some cases have been,
relegated to a somewhat minor role.166  For example, how the Com-
mission characterizes an amendment sheds light on their intentions,
161. 281 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2002).  In Thompson, the defendants were also convicted
of child pornography offenses. Id. at 1089–90.  The court found that an amend-
ment to the Guidelines distinguishing the amount of child pornography contained
in electronic formats was clarifying and therefore applicable. Id. at 1092–93.
162. Id. at 1093.
163. For a discussion on the importance of stare decisis see Charles W. Collier, Prece-
dent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 771 (1988) and
Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adju-
dication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1988).
164. See supra Part II.
165. See supra Parts II and III.
166. See United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109–10 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
the Commission’s statement of what an amendment is—i.e., clarifying or sub-
stantive—should not be determinative because “that would enable the Commis-
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but if the Commission’s intent is the critical component of the test, the
Commission would be able to make substantive changes by simply la-
beling an amendment as clarifying.167
C. Applying the New Test
Application of this new test makes amendment 651 a clarifying
amendment and therefore applicable.  First, the reasons proffered by
the Commission for the amendment shed no light on whether the
Commission intended to merely clarify or make substantive changes
to the Guidelines.  In Geerken, the court looked at the Commission’s
commentary for language that indicated the Commission’s intent.168
A similar exercise applied to amendment 651 produces no clear an-
swers.  On several occasions, when discussing the reasons for the
amendment, the Commission stated that the amendment “clarifies”
when a particular departure may be available and “more clearly sets
forth” the extent of particular departures.169  However, in its reason-
ing for the amendment the Commission also stated on several occa-
sions that the amendment “substantially restructures” particular
sections of the Guidelines,170 or expands the availability of departures
in “significant ways.”171  These conflicting remarks do little to deter-
mine the actual intent of the Commission.
Second, the amendment makes changes to the Guideline commen-
tary and policy statements as opposed to the actual guidelines them-
selves.  The new definition for a departure is found in the commentary
to the Instructions.172  Under the new test, making a change to the
commentary as opposed to the actual Guidelines supports a conclusion
that the amendment was merely clarifying and not substantive.
Third, the new definition for departure in amendment 651 does
overrule the prior judicial construction of how 4A1.3 departures were
resolved and therefore favors a finding that the amendment is sub-
stantive rather than clarifying.173  However, as noted earlier, just be-
cause an inconsistency in the case law and the Guidelines exist, “[does
sion to make substantive changes in the guise of ‘clarification’” (quoting United
States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1988))).
167. Id.
168. United States v. Geerken, 506 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2007)
169. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, at C-872 to C-876 (2009).
170. Id. at C-872.
171. Id. at C-877.
172. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(E); see also supra note 76 (discussing the distinction between
commentary and the Guidelines).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Shoupe, 35 F.3d 835, 836 (3d Cir. 1998) superseded by
regulation U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.1B1 cmt. n.1(E) as recog-
nized by United States v. Heilman, 377 Fed. Appx 157, 215–16 (holding that a
court may depart downward in both criminal history category and base offense
level and noting that other jurisdictions have done the same).
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not] require[ ] a conclusion that the amendment works a substantive
change in the law.”174 Also, if the circuits solely relied on whether or
not the amendment conflicted with their own construction of the law,
it is conceivable that inconsistencies would develop among the cir-
cuits.  For example, if the Commission promulgated an amendment
that conflicted with the precedent established by some circuits but in
others there was no conflict—either because their decisions were con-
sistent with the amendment or the circuit had never addressed the
issue—then that amendment could potentially be retroactive in some
circuits and not retroactive in others.  This incongruous result is not
consistent with the Guidelines’ stated goal of uniformity in sentencing
and is reminiscent of the pre-Guideline era when sentencing was akin
to the lottery.175  The potential for courts to reach different, though
perfectly plausible conclusions, from the same Guidelines is the rea-
son that resolution of ambiguity in the Guidelines ought to be the
most important and critical factor of the new test.
Amendment 651 resolves an ambiguity in the Guidelines.  A quick
review of several decisions involved in the split is illustrative.  The
Instructions to the Guidelines were the focal point of the decisions in
determining when 4A1.3 departures should be applied and whether
such a departure was a departure from rather than a departure to the
applicable guideline range.176 Tolliver, in part because of its reliance
on amendment 651, had little difficulty in determining that a 4A1.3
departure should be applied at step (i) and was therefore a departure
from the applicable guideline range.177  Equally as decisive in their
conclusion, the court in United States v. Munn,178 found the Instruc-
tions to be “well defined” but reached the exact opposite conclusion;
holding that 4A1.3 departures should be applied at step (f) and were
therefore a departure to the applicable guideline range.179  The court
in Flemming was not as decisive, it found that both readings of the
Instructions were “plausible.”180  The court noted that the Instruc-
tions “[were] not entirely clear” and that the court “cannot conclude
that the Instructions unambiguously compel” one conclusion over the
other.181  The court found the Instructions not only ambiguous but
also “grievously ambiguous and uncertain” such that the rule of lenity
should apply.182  These three cases demonstrate a textbook defini-
174. United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1998).
175. See supra Part II.
176. See supra Part IV.
177. United States v. Tolliver, 570 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2009).
178. 595 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).
179. Id. at 194.
180. United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 264–65.
181. Id. at 264.
182. Id. at 270.
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tion183 of ambiguity with Tolliver saying a 4A1.3 departure should be
applied after the applicable guideline range, Munn saying it should be
applied before, and Flemming stating that the Instructions are
grievously ambiguous.
Independent of conclusions reached by the circuits, the Instruc-
tions—prior to amendment 651—were ambiguous with regards to
when 4A1.3 departures should apply.  The Instructions appeared to
suggest that 4A1.3 departures could be applied either before or after
the applicable guideline range is established at step (h).  First, step (f)
of the Instructions states that a court should apply parts A and B from
chapter four of the Guidelines and 4A1.3 departures are found in part
A of chapter four.184  If applied at this step, the 4A1.3 departure
would be a departure to the applicable guideline range because it is
applied prior to step (h) and a defendant would be eligible for a sen-
tence reduction based on amendment 706.185  However, three steps
later, at step (i), the Instructions provide that courts may apply depar-
tures from chapter five or “any other policy statement[ ] or commen-
tary in the guidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing
sentence.”186  Section 4A1.3 of the Guidelines is a policy statement187
and a plausible reading of the Instructions would require 4A1.3 to be
applied at this step, after step (h).  If applied after step (h) the depar-
ture would be a departure from the applicable guideline range and the
defendant would not be eligible for a sentence reduction based on
amendment 706.188  This ambiguity destroys the fundamental pur-
pose of the Guidelines by eliminating uniformity; it allows for simi-
larly situated defendant’s to receive varying sentences based solely on
the court’s interpretation of when 4A1.3 departures should apply.189
The new definition of departures from amendment 651 eliminates
this ambiguity and achieves the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act by
promoting uniformity.  The new definition makes clear that all depar-
tures, including 4A1.3 departures are departures from the applicable
guideline range and should therefore be applied after the guideline
range is established at step (h).190  While the first three factors of the
test fail to provide a definitive answer as to whether amendment 651
183. The term “ambiguity” is defined as “an uncertainty of meaning or intention” and
further described—in the context of statutory interpretation—as “capable of
meaning two different things.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (8th ed. 2004).  The
ability of the court in Tolliver and Munn to reach opposite, yet definitive, inter-
pretations highlights the uncertainty of the Instructions.
184. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(f), 4A1.3 (2009).
185. See supra subsection II.A.2.
186. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(i).
187. Id. § 4A1.3.
188. See supra subsection II.A.2.
189. See supra Part II.
190. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt.  n.1(E); see also supra section
III.B (discussing the text and changes from amendment 651).
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is applicable, the fact that it resolves a grievous ambiguity in the law
tilts the scales in favor of applying amendment 651.  Because amend-
ment 651 should be applicable, Tolliver was correct in determining
that all departures, including 4A1.3 departures, are departures from
the applicable guideline range and therefore amendment 706 could
not apply to a career offender who was also granted a departure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Change is inevitable.  The Guidelines will continue to evolve to
achieve the goals of honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in federal
sentencing.  The constant evolution creates a need for a coherent sys-
tem to decide when amendments may be applied retroactively—par-
ticularly when dealing with claims for post-conviction relief.  The
prior-precedent test articulated in Flemming, while easy to apply, ig-
nores relevant factors.  For example, the test fails to consider the
Commission’s intent in passing the amendment and whether the
amendment changes the Guidelines or only changes a policy state-
ment or commentary.  Most importantly, the Flemming test fails to
consider if the amendment resolves an ambiguity in the Guidelines.  A
more nuanced approach—accounting for all of these factors—is the
appropriate way for courts to proceed.  Consideration of all of these
factors—most often focusing on whether ambiguity is resolved—will
promote the fundamental purpose of the Guidelines by providing more
uniform and consistent sentences across all circuits.  Equally as im-
portant, the framework will avoid decisions like Tolliver, where a
court may reach the correct conclusion but without any principled rea-
soning to guide the Commission, the courts, or attorneys on future de-
cisions regarding retroactive applicability of amendments.  In short,
the new test would provide attorneys and the courts with change they
can believe in.
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Table I*
















1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
Zone B
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
Zone C
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
Zone D
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
43 life life life life life life
*The Sentencing Table is found in the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A
(2009).
